Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.3

Let the starting point of our work, then, be the next question in order: whether the world is ruled by the power of one God or of many. No one who is truly wise and exercises reason fails to understand that there is a single Being who both founded all things and governs them with the very same power by which he created them. What need could there be for many to sustain the government of the world? One might suppose that if there were several, each would possess less strength and force; but that is exactly what proponents of many gods must claim, because if each cannot bear the helm of so vast a burden without the help of the others, they are necessarily weak. God, however, is eternal Mind, perfect and complete in virtue from every angle. If that is true, he must be one. Absolute power or virtue retains its own firmness; what is solid lacks nothing, and what is perfect admits no addition. Who would doubt that the mightiest king is the one who holds dominion over the whole world? And not without reason: all things everywhere belong to him, and all resources from every quarter flow to him alone. If many were to divide the world, each would certainly command less wealth and less strength, confined within a prescribed portion. The same holds for gods: if there are many, they are less powerful, since each has only as much as the others. The perfect nature of virtue can reside only in that which contains the whole, not in that which holds a mere fragment. Since God is perfect, as he must be, he cannot be anything but one, so that all things may be in him. Consequently, the virtues and powers of many gods would have to be weaker, because each lacks exactly as much as the others possess; the more there are, the smaller each becomes. Moreover, the supreme power of reality and divine strength cannot be divided even once. Whatever undergoes division must also undergo destruction. But destruction is remote from God, because he is incorruptible and eternal; therefore divine power cannot be divided. God is therefore one, since nothing else can possess equal power. Yet those who posit many gods claim that they have divided offices among themselves. We will debate all those claims in their proper place. For now I hold to the point at hand: if they have divided offices, the result is the same—no single one can suffice for all. Hence the one who cannot govern all things when the rest cease to act is not perfect. It follows that the world requires the perfect virtue of one, not the weakness of many. Anyone who thinks this vast magnitude cannot be ruled by a single being is mistaken and fails to grasp the greatness of divine strength and majesty. If the one God could make the world, he can certainly rule what he made. Consider the immensity of this divine work: though nothing existed before, it was brought into being from nothing by God's virtue and counsel—a work that could not have been begun or completed by anyone but one. Once this is grasped, it becomes clear that ruling what one has established is far easier than establishing it in the first place. Someone might object that not even a work as immense as the world could have been fashioned except by many. Let him imagine any multitude, any greatness, any magnitude of power, virtue, and majesty distributed among many; I gather all of it into one and declare that it exists in him, so that he possesses those qualities to a degree that cannot be thought or spoken. In this matter we fail both in perception and in language, because the human heart cannot grasp so great a light of understanding, nor can mortal tongue explain such things; yet we must understand and say this much. I see what might be said in opposition: that those many are exactly as we wish the one to be. But that cannot happen in any way, because the power of each cannot advance further when it encounters the powers of the others. Each must have his own limits, which he cannot cross, or if he crosses them he drives another back by his own boundaries. Those who believe in many gods do not see that it is possible for them to will different things, from which dispute and conflict would arise—just as Homer invented gods warring among themselves, some wanting Troy taken, others resisting. Therefore the world must be ruled by the decision of one. Unless the power of individual parts is referred to a single providence, the totality itself cannot hold together, each caring for nothing beyond what pertains to him—just as no military force can have more than one leader and ruler. If a single army had as many commanders as legions, cohorts, wedges, and wings, the battle line could not even be formed, each refusing danger, nor could it be easily directed or controlled, because all would follow their own counsels, whose diversity would harm more than help. So in this command of nature, unless there is one to whom the care of the whole sum is referred, all things will dissolve and collapse. To say the world is ruled by the will of many is like saying that a single body has many minds, because its members have many and varied functions, so that individual minds are thought to govern individual senses, and many affections—anger, desire, joy, fear, pity—are thought to be operated by as many minds. If someone actually says this, he does not even seem to possess the one mind he has. But if one mind in a single body governs so many things and attends to all simultaneously, why would anyone think the world cannot be ruled by one but can be by many? Because the defenders of many gods understand this, they say those gods preside over individual things and parts, yet insist there is still one supreme ruler. Then the rest are not gods at all, but satellites and ministers whom that one greatest and most powerful Being has appointed to those offices, to serve his command and nods. If all are not equal, then they are not all gods; the same thing cannot both serve and rule. If God is the name of the highest power, he must be incorruptible, perfect, impassible, subject to nothing. Therefore those whom necessity compels to obey the greatest God are not gods. But since those who think this way are not mistaken in vain, we will reveal the cause of their error shortly. Now we will confirm the unity of divine power with testimonies.