Origen of Alexandria, On First Principles

He will declare that the ecclesiastical proclamation contains the word concerning God's righteous anointing, and that this word—once it is believed to be true—also summons us to live well and to flee sin in every way. Its purpose is that, consoled by the Lord, we may take hold of what is the most necessary problem. To grasp what "self-moved" means, we must first unfold the concept itself; only when it has been accurately clarified will the matter under investigation be properly presented. Among things that move, some possess the cause of their motion within themselves, while others are moved only from outside. Things that are carried—wood, stones, and all matter held together merely by habit—are moved solely from outside. We may set aside the discussion of bodily locomotion for now, since it is not needed for the present subject. Animals, plants, and everything held together by nature or soul have the cause of their motion within themselves. Some say metals belong here as well, and add that fire is self-moved, perhaps also springs. Among those having the cause of motion in themselves, some are said to be moved from themselves, others from outside themselves. The non-living are moved from outside themselves; the living are moved from themselves. Living things move from themselves when a fantasy arises that provokes an impulse. Again, in certain animals fantasies arise that provoke an impulse, with their imaginative nature moving the impulse in an ordered way. In the spider a fantasy of weaving occurs, and an impulse follows to weave, its imaginative nature urging it to this very act, and the creature believes in nothing else beyond its own imaginative nature. In the bee the fantasy drives it to shape wax. The rational animal, however, possesses reason alongside its imaginative nature. Reason judges the fantasies, rejecting some and accepting others, so that the animal may be led according to them. Because the nature of reason contains starting-points for contemplating the good and the bad, we—following those starting-points—contemplate the good and the bad, choose the good, and turn away from the bad. When we give ourselves to practicing the good we are praiseworthy; when we do the opposite we are blameworthy. Yet we must not overlook that the larger part of the nature ordered toward all things is found in animals, whether to a greater or lesser degree. It is therefore near, so to speak, to the work of the rational in tracking dogs and war horses. To be subjected to this or that external thing, which stirs a fantasy in us one way or another, is admittedly not in our power. But to judge whether to use what has occurred in this way or otherwise is not the work of anyone else; it belongs to the reason within us—either working in us according to those starting-points toward impulses provoked to the good and to duty, or turning us away toward the opposite.