Origen of Alexandria, On First Principles

He will declare in the church's preaching that the message concerning God's righteous anointing is contained there, and this message, once believed true, urges people to live well and to flee sin in every way, precisely so that we may take up for ourselves the most necessary problem—that we possess it. In order to understand what the self-moved is, one must develop its concept, so that once it is clarified, the question at hand may be set forth precisely. Of things that move, some have the cause of their motion within themselves, while others are moved only from outside. Objects that are carried—such as wood, stones, and all matter held together solely by habit—are moved only from outside. Let the discussion of bodily motion be set aside for now, since it is not needed for the present subject. Animals and plants, and in general all things held together by nature or soul, have the cause of their motion within themselves; some say metals belong to this group, and in addition fire is self-moved, and perhaps springs as well. Among things that have the cause of motion in themselves, some are said to be moved from themselves, others from outside themselves: the non-living from outside themselves, the living from themselves. The living are moved from themselves when a fantasy occurs and provokes an impulse. Again, in some animals fantasies arise that provoke an impulse, with nature having arranged the fantasy so as to move the impulse in a fixed way, as in the spider a fantasy of weaving occurs and an impulse follows to weave, its fantasy nature having arranged it for this very thing, with no other thing believed by the animal after its fantasy, and in the bee for shaping wax. The rational animal, however, also possesses reason alongside its fantasy nature, reason that evaluates fantasies, rejecting some and accepting others, so that the animal may be led according to them. Since there are starting points in the nature of reason for contemplating the good and the bad, by following them we contemplate the good and the bad, choose the good and turn away from the bad; we are praiseworthy when we give ourselves to practicing the good, blameworthy when we do the opposite. It must not be overlooked, however, that the greater part of the nature ordered in all things exists quantitatively in animals, and for the most part or for the lesser part, so that it is near, one might say, the work of the rational in tracking dogs and war horses. Submitting to something external that moves a fantasy in us this way or that is admittedly not in our power; but to judge whether to use what has occurred in this way or otherwise is the work of the reason within us, whether it operates in us according to the starting points that urge us toward the good and toward duty, or turns us away toward the opposite.