Civil Authority

Tertullian, On the Crown 11

Tertullian · c. 155–c. 220 AD

Before I take up the question of the military crown itself, I first have to investigate whether military service is compatible with Christianity at all. What is the point of debating the incidental details when the fault lies in the very foundation? Do we really think a human oath can override a divine one, or that we can serve another lord after Christ? Are we allowed to forsake father, mother, and every neighbor—people the Law commands us to honor and love after God, people the Gospel also honored without ranking them above Christ alone? Is it permitted to live by the sword when the Lord declared that whoever lives by the sword dies by the sword (Matthew 26:52)? Will the son of peace engage in battle when quarreling is unfitting for him? Will he administer chains, prison, torture, and execution when he is not an avenger of his own wrongs? Will he pull guard duty—perhaps even more than Christ did—or serve on the Lord's day when not even Christ did? Will he stand watch over temples he has renounced? Will he dine where the apostle says not to? Will he defend at night the very demons he exorcised by day, leaning on the spear that pierced Christ's side? Will he carry a standard that rivals Christ's? Will he demand a sign from a commander when he has already received one from God? Even in death, will a bugler's trumpet disturb him when he awaits the angel's trumpet? Will a Christian be burned by military discipline when burning was forbidden him, when Christ granted him the rewards of fire? How many other transgressions of military duty must we count as transgressions? Simply transferring the name from the camps of light to the camps of darkness is itself a transgression.

Admittedly, if faith overtakes men already in the service, the case is different—like those John admitted to baptism, like the most faithful centurions whom Christ approved and Peter catechized. Yet once faith is received and the seal given, there are only three options: desert immediately, as many have done; evade every possible way so as to commit nothing against God that the military permits; or finally, endure for God's sake, a path even pagan faith has allowed. Military service promises neither impunity for sins nor immunity for martyrs. The Christian is never anything else anywhere. There is one Gospel, and the same Jesus, who denies every denier and confesses every confessor of God, who saves the soul lost for his name and destroys the one gained against his name. Before him, a faithful pagan is as much a soldier as an unbelieving pagan is a soldier. The status of faith admits no necessities. There is no necessity to sin for those whose single necessity is not to sin. Even when someone is forced by torture or punishment to sacrifice or deny directly, discipline does not yield to that necessity, because the necessity of fearing denial and undergoing martyrdom outweighs the necessity of avoiding suffering and fulfilling duty. Moreover, this kind of justification subverts the entire substance of the sacrament, loosening the bond even for voluntary sins. The will itself can claim necessity, since it always has something to compel it. I have already established this for the other official crowns as well, where the plea of necessity is most familiar: either the offices must be avoided so we do not fall into sins, or martyrdoms must be endured so we break the offices. I will not belabor the first part of the question—the illegitimacy of military service itself—so that the second part may be addressed, lest I demolish the military entirely and then argue about its crown in vain.

Latin

Etenim, ut ipsam caussam coronae militaris aggrediar, puto prius conquirendum an in totum Christianis militia conveniat. Quale est alioquin de accidentibus retractare, cum a praecedentibus culpa sit? Credimusne humanum sacramentum divino superduci licere, et in alium dominum respondere post Christum? et ejerare patrem ac matrem, et omnem proximum, quos et lex honorari et post Deum diligi praecipit, quos et Evangelium solo Christo pluris non faciens, sic quoque honoravit? Licebit in gladio conversari, Domino pronuntiante, gladio periturum qui gladio fuerit usus? Et praelio operabitur filius pacis, cui nec litigare conveniet? Et vincula et carcerem et tormenta et supplicia administrabit, nec suarum ultor injuriarum? Jam stationes, aut alii magis faciet quam Christo? aut et Dominico die, quando nec Christo? et excubabit pro templis, quibus renuntiavit? et coenabit illic ubi apostolo non placet? et quos interdiu exorcismis fugavit, noctibus defensabit, incumbens et requiescens super pilum quo perfossum est latus Christi? vexillum quoque portabit aemulum Christi? et signum postulabit a principe, qui jam a Deo accepit? mortuus etiam tuba inquietabitur aeneatoris, qui excitari a tuba angeli exspectat? et cremabitur ex disciplina castrensi Christianus, cui cremare non licuit, cui Christus merita ignis indulsit? Quanta alia in delictis circumspici possunt castrensium munium, transgression interpretanda? Ipsum de castris lucis in castra tenebrarum nomen deferre, transgressio est. Plane, si quos militia praeventos fides posterior invenit, alia conditio est, ut illorum quos Joannes admittebat ad lavacrum, ut centurionum fidelissimorum, quem Christus probat, et quem Petrus catechizat: dum tamen, suscepta fide atque signata, aut deserendum statim sit, ut a multis actum, aut omnibus modis cavillandum, ne quid adversus Deum committatur, quae nec ex militia permittuntur; aut novissime perpetiendum pro Deo, quod aeque fides pagana condixit. Nec enim delictorum impunitatem, aut martyriorum immunitatem militia promittet. Nusquam Christianus aliud est. Unum Evangelium, et idem Jesus, negaturus omnem negatorem, et confessurus omnem confessorem Dei, et salvam facturus animam pro nomine ejus amissam, perditurus autem de contrario adversus nomen ejus lucri habitam. Apud hunc tam miles est paganus fidelis, quam paganus est miles infidelis. Non admittit status fidei necessitates. Nulla est necessitas delinquendi, quibus una est necessitas non delinquendi. Nam et ad sacrificandum et directo negandum necessitate quis premitur tormentorum sive poenarum: tamen nec illi necessitati disciplina connivet, quia potior est necessitas timendae negationis et obeundi martyrii, quam evadendae passionis et implendi officii. Caeterum subvertit totam substantiam sacramenti causatio ejusmodi, ut etiam voluntariis delictis fibulam laxet. Nam et voluntas poterit necessitas contendi, habens scilicet unde cogatur. Vel ipsam praestruxerim et ad caeteras officialium coronarum caussas, quibus familiarissima est advocatio necessitatis: cum idcirco aut officia fugienda sint, ne in delictis incidamus; aut et martyria toleranda sint, ut officia rumpamus. De prima specie quaestionis etiam militiae ipsius illicitae, plura non faciam, ut secunda reddatur, ne si omni ope expulero militiam, frustra jam de corona militari provocarim.

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