Cap. 1 Prolegomena: four points before the controversy
Chapter I. Prolegomena. But so that this whole matter may come into the light more easily, it will not be out of place to set a few things before the dispute itself — things whose explanation will open the way into this controversy. First: in questions of predestination or reprobation the very order of our thought breeds the sharpest fights, while one claims that in God's intellect and decrees this is prior which another holds is posterior. So we must speak briefly of this whole account of priority and posteriority under the diverse signs of reason. Second: because the words Election, Predestination, and Reprobation are used differently by different writers, we must explain the force of the words themselves, and show in what sense others take them, and in what sense we do. Third: because writers argue differently about the qualities or conditions of the subject, it will be worth setting out what is absolutely required and presupposed in the subject of predestination or reprobation when that subject is considered in common. Last: besides the common conditions required equally and without distinction whether someone is made the subject of predestination or of reprobation, some place further distinguishing qualities or conditions, by whose difference the act of Divine predestination falls on one and the act of reprobation on another. Those too must be weighed for what force they have. For some who refer the difference of election and reprobation to such things — whether our qualities or our acts — still will not let them be called causes, much less merits, and only grudgingly allow them even to be named conditions of our predestination. But let us gird for the work, and begin from those signs or distinct instants that theologians usually assign and separate according to prior and posterior order in the acts of both the Divine intellect and the Divine will.
Latin
Cap. I. Prolegomena. Sed quo tota haec res in lucem proferatur facilius, non abs re erit ipsi disputationi praemittere nonnulla, quorum explicatio viam sternet huic controversiae intelligendae. Primo igitur, quia in illis quaestionibus quae de praedestinatione aguntur, aut reprobatione, maximas lites parit ipse ordo considerationis nostrae, dum alius contendit in intellectu & decretis Divinis illud esse prius, quod alius opinatur esse posterius, de tota hac ratione prioritatis & posterioritatis quoad diversa signa rationis, paucis differendum est. Secundo, quia ipsa vocabula Electionis, Praedestinationis, Reprobationis, diversimode a diversis usurpantur, necesse erit ipsam vocabulorum vim explanare, & quo sensu ab aliis, quo a nobis accipiantur, ostendere. Tertio, quia de qualitatibus sive conditionibus subjecti, diversi diverso modo philosophantur, operae pretium erit exponere, quid absolute requiratur & praesupponitur in ipso subjecto praedestinationis aut reprobationis promiscue considerato. Ultimo, quia praeter conditiones communes, quae ex aequo & indiscriminatim requiruntur, sive quis praedestinationis sive reprobationis subjectum statuatur, nonnulli insuper qualitates sive conditiones distinguentes ponunt, pro quarum discrimine actus praedestinationis Divinae in unum cadat, actus reprobationis in alterum, de hisce etiam, quam vim habeant, dispiciendum erit. Nam aliqui qui discrimen electionis & reprobationis ad hujusmodi, sive qualitates sive actus nostros, referunt, non patiuntur tamen ut causae appellentur, multo minus ut merita, imo non nisi gravate concedunt, ut vel conditiones praedestinationis nostrae nuncupentur. Sed ad rem accingamur: & ordiamur ab illis signis sive diversis instantibus, quae a Theologis assignari & distingui solent secundum ordinem prioris & posterioris, in actibus tum intellectus tum voluntatis Divinae.