Prolegomena III: order founded in things' dependence; final vs efficient cause
Third: because our intellect is weak, we are often forced, when explaining predestination, to conceive something as before and something as after — as when we think God first considered the human being as fallen, before as elect in Christ; or when we say God first destines a person to eternal life, before to efficacious grace. So let us see where this order of before and after, which we mark in the Divine acts, is founded. Not in God's knowledge or will considered in itself: in Divine things all are simultaneous in duration. It is founded in the relation of the things themselves, insofar as one depends on another. Therefore, in our mode of consideration, that is prior in the Divine mind and will from which another hangs in the order of causality; that is posterior which hangs from another. If one stands wholly independent of another, neither is prior or posterior to the other. Next, mark carefully: the same thing can be prior and posterior to another in different kinds of cause. Compare an efficient or dispositive cause with a final one. In the kind of final cause, health is prior to the drug: it moves the physician to give it and the sick person to take it. But in the kind of efficient cause the drug is prior to health: by its virtue and efficacy the sick person is brought back to health. So in predestination: the will to give eternal life is conceived prior to the will to give efficacious grace in the order of final cause — for from the intention of giving life arises the decree to give such grace. But in the order of efficient cause the will to give grace is prior, and grace is given so that by its virtue and efficacy going before, the person may be led through to glory. That is what the Philosopher hints (Ethics 3.8): what is last in intention is first in execution, and the reverse. The reason is plain. In the act of willing and intending, that has the account of a cause which by desire and love of itself moves the agent to seek and apply such means; but in the act of executing, that has the account of a cause which advances the end itself and works toward obtaining it. So Báñez: the end which in the agent's intention has the account of a cause with respect to the means, when set in execution has the account of an effect, and the means themselves have the account of an efficient cause toward it. Mark this well: although in reality there is one and the same act of will in God by which he wills both means and end, the end through the means, and the means for the end, still in our mode of understanding all these are distinguished — and hence the tangled questions which of them is prior or posterior in the Divine will. To meet those questions, always weigh what order of causality the things themselves have among themselves: they are understood to carry the same order of priority. Add this too: although in the acts of the Divine will as to the thing there is no before or after, God does not will created things in a confused, unordered heap. It is true that in God there are not many volitions, nor one prior to another; yet by one most simple act of his will he willed one thing to be for another, and one to depend on another. Hence that consideration of before and after which properly belongs to the things themselves is attributed by us to the Divine decrees. So whenever the dispute is about God's knowledge — asking of two which he knew first — or about his will — asking of two which he decreed first — always remember: this priority or posteriority does not inhere really, truly, and formally in the acts of the Divine mind and will themselves, but is considered from the side of the things God has known and decreed, among which he willed a true and real before and after. And for our purpose, that is enough on this point.
Latin
Tertio, quia propter imbecillitatem intellectus nostri cogimur saepenumero in materia praedestinationis explicanda, aliquid concipere ut prius, aliquid ut posterius (ut cum cogitamus Deum prius considerasse hominem ut lapsum, quam ut in Christo electum; vel cum affirmamus Deum prius hominem destinare ad vitam aeternam, quam ad gratiam efficacem) videamus qua in re fundetur hic ordo prioritatis & posterioritatis, quem consideramus in actibus Divinis. Non in ipsa scientia vel voluntate Dei secundum se: nam in Divinis, omnia sunt simul duratione. Fundatur itaque in ipsa rerum habitudine, prout una ex altera dependet. Quocirca secundum modum considerationis nostrae illud prius intelligitur in mente & voluntate Divina, a quo aliud pendet secundum ordinem causalitatis; illud posterius, quod pendet ab alio: si autem unum se habeat prorsus independenter ad aliud, neutrum dicendum est altero prius aut posterius. Dein, diligenter animadvertendum est, idem in diverso genere causae posse esse prius & posterius altero. Quod evidenter apparebit si causam effectivam seu dispositivam cum finali comparemus. Nam in genere causae finalis sanitas est prior pharmaco: movet etenim tum medicum ut det, tum aegrotum ut illud accipiat: At in genere causae effectivae pharmacum est prius sanitate: nam ejus virtute & efficacia aegrotus ad sanitatem reducitur. Sic in negotio praedestinationis, voluntas dandi vitam aeternam concipitur prior voluntate dandi efficacem gratiam in ordine causae finalis: nam ex intentione dandi vitam oritur decretum dandi talem gratiam: At in ordine causae effectivae prior est voluntas dandi gratiam, quae ideo datur ut ejus virtute & efficacia praeeunte homo perducatur ad gloriam. Atque hoc est quod a Philosopho innuitur, Ethic. 3. cap. 8. ubi docet, illud quod est ultimum in intentione, esse primum in executione; & e contra. Ratio hujus discriminis manifesta est; Quia in actu volendi & intendendi illud habet rationem causae, quod sui desiderio & amore movet efficientem ad talia media quaerenda & applicanda; in actu autem exsequendi illud habet rationem causae quod ipsum finem promovet, & operatur ad finis consecutionem. Sic Bannesius, Finis qui in intentione operantis habet rationem causae respectu mediorum, in exsecutione positus habet rationem effectus, & ipsa media habent rationem efficientis respectu ejus. Hoc valde observandum: nam cum secundum rem sit unicus & idem actus voluntatis in Deo, quo vult tam media quam finem, & finem per media, & media propter finem; tamen secundum nostrum intelligendi modum haec omnia distinguuntur: & hinc perplexae quaestiones, quid horum prius, quid posterius in voluntate Divina. Ut hisce occurratur, semper perpendendum est quem ordinem causalitatis res ipsae inter se habeant: nam eundem prioritatis habere intelliguntur. Hoc etiam addendum est, licet in actibus Divinae voluntatis quoad rem nulla sit prioritas vel posterioritas, tamen Deus non vult res creatas confuse & inordinate. Verum est quidem, in Deo non esse volitiones multas, nec unam alia priorem: sed unico tamen simplicissimo actu voluntatis suae voluit unam rem esse propter aliam, unam esse dependentem ab alia. Et hinc illa consideratio prioritatis & posterioritatis, quae proprie competit ipsis rebus, a nobis tribuitur ipsis decretis Divinis. Quapropter, quoties disceptatur sive de scientia Dei, quaerendo, ex duobus utrum hoc an illud prius sciverit; sive de voluntate, quaerendo ex duobus utrum hoc an illud prius decreverit; semper meminisse debetis, hanc prioritatem aut posterioritatem non inesse reapse, vere, & formaliter, ipsis actibus mentis & voluntatis Divinae, sed considerari ex parte rerum a Deo cognitarum & decretarum, inter quas Deus voluit esse veram & realem quandam prioritatem & posterioritatem. Atque haec pro instituto nostro, hac de re dixisse sufficiat.