Two Dissertations · §217 · John Davenant

Cap. 1 prol. IV: common vs distinguishing — Davenant denies foresight discriminators

You already see the great difference between those earlier subject-conditions we called common, and these later ones we call distinguishing. Rational nature, and nature under sin, is presupposed in the predestined and the reprobate so that nothing in them is set as cause, reason, or occasion of the divide. Good and evil works, faith and unbelief, are instead set as foresight conditions in people so that the very divide between the predestined and the reprobate proceeds according to them. We grant the earlier conditions as prerequisites — so that a subject can, commonly and without distinction, lie under God as he predestines and reprobates. But these later ones, which many try to fix in place, we flatly deny: they are not presupposed or foreseen by God in the person to be predestined or reprobated, nor do different foresight varieties of them always drive different acts of predestination and reprobation onto different persons.

Latin

Videtis jam magnum discrimen inter priores illas conditiones subjecti, quas communes appellavimus, & has posteriores, quas distinguentes nuncupamus. Nam natura Rationalis, & Peccato subdititia, praesupponitur in subjecto praedestinato & reprobato, ut in illis nulla ponatur causa, ratio, aut occasio discriminis; sed Bona opera & Mala, Fides & Infidelitas, ita ponuntur praevisae condiciones in hominibus, ut secundum illas procedat ipsum discrimen hominum praedestinatorum aut reprobatorum. Quanquam ergo concedamus priores conditiones praerequisitas, ut subjectum communiter & promiscue possit subjacere Deo praedestinanti & reprobanti, tamen hasce posteriores, quas multi stabilire conantur, prorsus pernegamus praesupponi & praevideri a Deo in homine praedestinando aut reprobando, aut pro earum diversitate praevisa diversos actus praedestinationis atque reprobationis tendere semper in diversas personas.

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