Cap. II Sol. Arg. 5 Secundo: approbative vs effectual will — no singular sufficient grace from approval
Second: God is said to will something by a will of affection or of effect — so Thomas in the Disputed Questions on the will of God, art. 1 — or, as others put it, approbatively (what is good and lovable in itself) or efficaciously (what he has decreed to work for his glory in some particular person). The first is only the divine will's simple delight in a thing as fitting God's nature; the second is an absolute decree to give that good to someone in particular. Chastity, wisdom, faith, salvation are lovable goods, and in themselves agreeable to God's will — so we rightly say God wills all people to be chaste, wise, faithful, and saved. Hear that of the approving will, which looks at the thing as such, not of the effecting will, which decides to work it in this or that person. From that prior will — which of itself settles nothing about particular persons — they cannot force the claim that God wills to grant each person whatever suffices for his salvation. Still less can they hang on it that, from foresight of who will use those means well and who will not, he elects some to salvation and passes by and reprobates others.
Latin
Secundo, notandum est Deum dici velle aliquid voluntate affectionis, vel voluntate effectus, ut distinguit Thomas, Quaest. Disp. De voluntate Dei, art. 1. vel ut alii loquuntur, Deus dicitur velle aliquid approbative, ut quod est in se bonum & amabile, vel efficaciter, ut quod decrevit propter gloriam suam in singulari aliquo subjecto efficere. Prior voluntas nihil aliud designat quam simplicem complacentiam Divinae voluntatis in re aliqua, tanquam Divinae naturae consentanea: Posterior denotat absolutum decretum communicandi hoc bonum singulariter alicui personae. Verbi causa, Castitas, Sapientia, Fides, Salus, sunt bona amabilia, & considerata in se Divinae voluntati consentanea: Recte igitur dicimus Deum velle ut omnes homines casti, sapientes, fideles, salvi fiant. Sed hoc intelligendum de voluntate approbante, quae tendit in rem secundum se consideratam, non de voluntate efficiente, quae statuit rem talem in tali persona operari. Frustra igitur ab illa priori voluntate, quae per se nihil decernit de singularibus personis, moliuntur illud deducere, Deum velle cuivis singulari personae concedere quod sufficit ad salutem ejus procurandam. Frustra etiam huic subnectunt, Deum ex praevisione quinam sint recte usuri hisce mediis, quinam minime, alios eligere ad salutem, alios praeterire & reprobare.