Cap. III Sol. Rat. 12 close: God's hand leads firmly and sweetly — Valentia, Catharinus
So it is God's hand, not ours, that we do not depart from God. That hand leads the elect to eternal life with such efficacy that his decree stands most firm — and with such sweetness and liberty that their choice in the good becomes most free. Valencia grants both can stand together (In 1. q.23 disp.1 p.4), and notes the oldest, most learned Scholastics held it. Ambrosius Catharinus too: grant a justification from which the predestinated cannot fall, and most free choice is not removed but made firmer and stronger by certainty of light and added fortitude. Ability not to persevere in faith, to fall from holiness — in a word, to sin and perish — is not liberty or part of liberty, but free choice's disease or weakness. When a contrary, strongest, most persevering will is given so that weakness cannot go into act, free choice is not destroyed but established free in the good. The freer the will, the less it can serve sin (Augustine, De praed. Sanct. 1.15). So the Jesuit's argument is worthless: The antecedent decree makes the elect unable to fall from salvation, therefore it takes away their free choice.
Latin
Manus igitur Dei est, non nostra, ut non discedamus a Deo: Manus autem Dei tanta efficacitate ducit et dirigit electos ad vitam aeternam, ut inde firmissimum stet ejus decretum; et simul tanta suavitate et libertate, ut inde liberrimum in bono fiat illorum arbitrium. Haec simul constare posse, fatetur Valentia, In 1. qu. 23. disp. 1. puncto 4. ubi ostendit, antiquissimos et doctissimos Scholasticos in hac opinione fuisse constitutos. Ambrosius etiam Catharinus affirmat, concessa tali justificatione, a qua non valeant excidere qui praedestinati sunt, non auferri liberrimum arbitrium, sed potius firmius et validius fieri per certitudinem luminis, et per adjectum robur fortitudinis. Unde posse non perseverare in fide, posse deficere a sanctitate, uno verbo, posse peccare et perire, non est libertas, aut pars libertatis, sed liberi arbitrii morbus vel imbecillitas. Cum igitur data voluntate contraria, eademque fortissima et perseverantissima, efficitur ut in actum non possit exire haec imbecillitas, liberum arbitrium non perimitur, sed liberum in bono stabilitur. Tanto enim magis libera est voluntas, quanto magis peccato servire non potest, ut bene Augustinus De praed. Sanct. lib. 1. cap. 15. Nihili igitur est Jesuitae argumentum; Decretum Dei antecedens facit ut electi non possint excidere a salute, ergo tollit eorum liberum arbitrium.