Two Dissertations · §505 · John Davenant

Cap. VII: our sense — negative reprobation from freest will; Episcopius on not-willing the highest good

But as we taught that election's benefit hangs on God's gratuitous good pleasure, not on some prior good act of man, so the negation of that benefit — which we call non-election, passing by, or negative reprobation — we fetch from the same freest will of God, acting according to his own will. Episcopius, often worst in philosophy, here not badly (Theses, Disp. 22 on Justification, th. 3): it is one thing not to will to punish; another to will to affect someone with the highest good. By parity we say: it is one thing to will to punish someone; another not to will to affect someone with the highest good.

Latin

Nos autem, sicuti ipsum electionis beneficium ex gratuito Dei beneplacito, non ex praeeunte aliquo hominis bono actu pendere docuimus, ita negationem ejusdem beneficii, quam non-electionem, praeteritionem, sive reprobationem negativam appellare solemus, ex eadem liberrima Dei voluntate arcessimus, facientis de suo quod vult. Qui in multis pessime, in hoc non male philosophatur Episcopius, in Thesibus suis Disput. 22. de Justific. thes. 3: Aliud longe est, inquit, non velle punire; aliud, summo bono aliquem afficere velle. Nos a pari etiam dicimus: Aliud longe est velle aliquem punire, aliud non velle aliquem summo bono afficere.

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