Cap. VIII Resp. Secundo cont.: Rom. 1 / 2 Thess. / Pharaoh — further hardening vs first permissive denial
Finally: the hardening Paul regards in Rom. 1:28 — He gave them over to a reprobate mind — and that which 2 Thess. 2:10-12 depicts — Because they received not the love of the truth, God shall send them strong delusion that they believe a lie — do not denote denial of the first efficacious grace, without which such hardening would never have come. They denote subtraction of some granted grace after its abuse — which subtraction we grant arises from men's demerits — and the hardening that follows we acknowledge as both sin and the wage of preceding sin. What is said of Pharaoh (Exod. 9: Jehovah hardened Pharaoh's heart) must either be taken of the first denial of special grace and permissive hardening — and then that will to harden, i.e. not to soften, as mere gratuitous negation of an act on God's part, could not arise from Pharaoh's foresighted demerits, because it precedes such foresight. Here refuge is Rom. 9: He has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens. Or those words may refer to a further hardening by which Pharaoh, of voluntary obstinacy, stiffened his own heart, God outwardly and inwardly furnishing occasions by which he certainly foresaw Pharaoh would be more hardened — even if by nature those occasions ought to have softened him. So God hardens an ungodly man for his demerits when, provoked by impiety, he takes occasion to withdraw granted grace and to act in ways he knows will make such a man worse. God is also said to harden without that regard to final demerits — only because he wills — when to a man considered in the common mass he has not prepared or given that special mercy he granted another in the same miserable condition. That is the hardening which argues reprobation, and it does not depend on foresight of final perseverance in sins. So the argument proceeds from an equivocation.
Latin
Denique illa induratio, quam respicit Apostolus, Rom. i. 28, Quo spectant illa verba, Tradidit illos in reprobum sensum; item et illa quam 2 Thess. ii. 10, 11, 12, Apostolus hisce verbis depingit, Quia non receperunt amorem veritatis, propterea iis mittet Deus efficaciam deceptionis, ut credant mendacio, etc., non denotant negationem primae gratiae efficacis, qua posita talis obduratio nunquam evenisset, sed subductionem gratiae alicujus concessae, ex abusu ejusdem, quam subductionem fieri ex hominum demeritis non diffitemur: atque obdurationem inde consequentem et peccatum et peccati praecedentis mercedem agnoscimus. Quod autem de Pharaone dicitur Exod. ix. Obduravit Jehovah cor Pharaonis, id aut de prima negatione gratiae specialis, et permissiva obduratione intelligi debet, et tum haec voluntas obdurandi, id est, non-emolliendi, quae consideratur ut negatio gratuita actionis ex parte Dei, non potuit ex praevisis Pharaonis demeritis oriri, quia talem praevisionem antecedit. Hic igitur ad illud Apostoli confugiendum est, Miserebitur cujus vult, et quem vult indurat. Vel possunt illa verba ad ulteriorem obdurationem referri, qua Pharao voluntaria pervicacia cor suum obfirmavit, Deo exterius et interius praebente illas occasiones, quibus certo praescivit Pharaonem magis obdurandum, etiamsi ex natura sua valere debuissent ad illum emolliendum. Deus igitur obdurat hominem impium propter sua demerita, quando ejus impietate provocatus sumit occasionem subducendi gratiam concessam, et quaedam agendi, ex quibus novit talem hominem fore deteriorem. Ac Deus etiam indurare dicitur absque hoc intuitu ad finalia demerita, ideo tantum quia vult, quando homini in communi massa considerato non praeparavit, non dedit illam specialem misericordiam, quam alteri in eadem misera conditione concessit. Atque haec est illa induratio quae arguit reprobationem, quaeque ex praevisione finalis perseverantiae in peccatis haud dependet. Ex aequivoco igitur non procedit argumentatio.