Cap. VIII Arg. 10 Resp.: if from foresight of obstacles, all would be reprobate; election softens some (Aquinas)
Third: where God is presumed to will to deny no one that special mercy proper to election, and so to reprobate no one except who is foresighted as casting an obstacle to divine grace by perverse use of free will, Argentina misses that this exception about opposing an obstacle applies to each and all considered in the state of sin. Aquinas observed prudently (Contra Gentiles 3.160): the saying IT IS IN THE POWER OF FREE WILL NOT TO PRESENT AN IMPEDIMENT TO GRACE is truly said of those whose natural power is intact; he who by prior inordination has declined to evil is no longer altogether in his power so to will as to present an impediment. Since all mortals are of themselves ready to put obstacles, and in fact put very many, if God reprobated from such foresight he would have reprobated every one of us, not one excepted. So the pattern of predestination and reprobation shines here: though all put obstacles, God from abundance of mercy decreed finally to soften some — by efficacious and wondrous ways — out of their impediments and convert them to faith and repentance; others struggling the same way against his grace he decreed not to soften, but to leave hardened in their hardness and obstinacy. Finally the inference — that God from eternity foresaw some as finally using free will well, others ill, and by a decree following that foresight elected these and reprobated those — cannot stand. Good sound use of free will persevering to the end flowed only from election's grace, so it presupposes antecedent election. Conversely, evil use lasting to the last breath is not foresighted unless God's will to deny that special grace — which no heart, however hard, resists — is presupposed. That will of God is the will to reprobate. So foresight of a finally hardened heart is something later than reprobation; the reason or cause of reprobation cannot be sought from it.
Latin
Tertio, ubi Deus praesumitur nemini velle denegare hanc specialem misericordiam, quae electionis propria est, atque idcirco neminem reprobare, nisi qui praevisus fuerit ut gratiae Divinae obicem injiciens perverso usu liberi sui arbitrii, non animadvertit Argentina, hanc exceptionem de obice opponendo ad omnes et singulos pertinere in statu peccati consideratos. Nam prudenter observatum est ab Aquinate: Id quod dici solet, IN POTESTATE LIBERI ARBITRII ESSE NE IMPEDIMENTUM GRATIAE PRAESTET, de iis vere dicitur in quibus naturalis potentia integra fuerit: Quod per inordinationem praecedentem declinaverit ad malum, jam non erit omnino in sua potestate ut velit impedimentum praestare. Contr. Gent. lib. 3. cap. 160. Cum igitur omnes mortales ex se parati sint ad obices ponendos, et de facto ponant quamplurimos, si Deus ex tali praevisione reprobaret, omnes quotquot sumus, ne uno quidem excepto, reprobasset. Praedestinationis ergo et reprobationis specimen in hoc elucet, quod cum obices ponantur ab omnibus, Deus, ex abundantia misericordiae suae, quosdam impedimentis suis, tamen efficacibus et miris modis tandem emollire, et ad fidem et resipiscentiam convertere decrevit; alios autem eodem in modo gratiae suae obluctantes non emollire decrevit, sed in duritia sua et pervicacia obduratos relinquere. Denique quod ex praemissis infertur, nempe Deum ab aeterno praevidisse quosdam ut finaliter bene usuros libero arbitrio, alios ut finaliter male usuros eodem, atque ita decreto hanc praevisionem subsequente hos elegisse, illos reprobasse, id nullo modo potest consistere. Bonus enim et sanus usus liberi arbitrii in finem usque perseverans non nisi ex gratia electionis dimanavit; ergo electionem antecedentem praesupponit: E contra, malus usus liberi arbitrii, perdurans ad extremum usque halitum, non praevidetur nisi praesupposita in Deo voluntate negandi illam specialem gratiam, cui nullum cor, quantumvis durum, resistit: At haec voluntas Dei est voluntas reprobandi: Praevisio igitur cordis finaliter obdurati est quiddam reprobatione posterius, atque idcirco ratio sive causa reprobationis inde peti non potest.