Two Dissertations · §558 · John Davenant

Cap. VIII Resp.: Durandus, Thomas, Gerson — unequal gifts from liberality are not injustice

The Scholastics answer more briefly: it is not unjust or vicious to give unequals to equals where the gift is from mere liberality — only where something is rendered from debt. So Durandus (Sentences 1, dist. 41, q. 2 ad 1). Thomas to the same effect: There is no iniquity with God if he prepare unequals for equals. It would be against justice if the effect of predestination were rendered as debt and not given. Of things given from grace, one may at pleasure give more or less to whom he will, provided he subtracts from none what is owed (ST I, q. 23 a. 5 ad 3). Gerson in the Moral Rules: there is no respect of persons except where debt and parity stand on both sides; in free gifts, to take one and dismiss another is not respect of persons. So the major's consequence in the argument is plainly null: in predestination God gives the predestined not owed but not owededed grace; in reprobation he denies the reprobate not an owed benefit but an not owededed one.

Latin

Scholastici respondent magis succinte, Non esse injustum aut vitiosum dare inaequalia aequalibus, ubi aliquid datur ex mera liberalitate, sed ubi ex debito redditur. Sic Durandus lib. 1. dist. 41. qu. 2. resp. ad 1. In eandem sententiam Thomas, Non est iniquitas apud Deum, si inaequalia aequalibus praeparet. Hoc enim esset contra justitiae rationem, si praedestinationis effectus ex debito redderetur, et non daretur. Ex his enim quae ex gratia dantur, potest aliquis pro libito suo dare cui vult plus vel minus, dummodo nulli subtrahat debitum, Part. 1. quaest. 23. art. 5. resp. ad 3. Denique Gerson in Regulis Moralibus idem affirmat, Non est acceptio personarum nisi ubi debitum est et paritas utrobique, quia in gratis faciendis unum capere, alium dimittere, non est acceptio personarum. Ex hisce igitur perspicuum est, consequentiam Majoris in praedicto argumento fuisse plane nullam: quia in praedestinatione Deus non dat praedestinato debitam sed indebitam gratiam; atque similiter in reprobatione non denegat reprobato debitae sed indebitae gratiae beneficium.

Report a mistake in this passage

About this text

John Davenant argues from Scripture that Christ's death is a remedy offered to every person, so that anyone who hears the Gospel may be called to believe, and then opens a second dissertation on predestination.

John Davenant (1572–1641) was Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, bishop of Salisbury from 1621, and England's leading delegate to the Synod of Dort. A Reformed theologian of the moderate school, he defended universal atonement language within a Calvinist frame.

The Two Dissertations (1650) press two theses: that Christ died sufficiently for all, and that God sincerely calls all who hear the gospel — against the novel claim that Christ died only for the elect in every sense. They are Davenant's mature statement of the hypothetical-universalist position that divided English Calvinists.

This volume covers the opening of the first dissertation through the close of chapter 3, with the theses on the extent of Christ's death.

Date1572–1641 AD (Bishop of Salisbury; 1650 Cambridge imprint)

The 1683 reprint was not used as base text. No modern English was copied.

Printed text used

Also checked PDF of the 1650 (Latin · print facsimile)
Also checked DjVu machine-read text of the 1650 (Latin)

We have not yet re-checked this work against its source. We made this study translation with AI help. No scholar has yet certified it as faithful and complete. Open Latin on any section, or the Latin source link, to see the source text. It is not a critical edition.

Report a mistake