Cap. VIII Resp. Primo: we deny foresight as origin of negative reprobation, not of preparing punishment (Aquinas on Rom. 9)
First, always hold this: when we deny that reprobation took origin from foresight of human demerits, we mean reprobation as denied preparation of efficacious grace for certain persons — not as preparation of eternal punishment for those same persons. With Aquinas we gladly grant: foresight of merits cannot be any reason of predestination, because foresighted merits themselves fall under predestination; yet foresight of sins can be some reason of reprobation on the side of the punishment prepared for the reprobate, insofar as God proposes to punish the wicked for sins they have from themselves, not from God (Thomas, Commentary on Romans 9, lect. 2, near the end).
Latin
Primo, id semper tenendum est, Quando negamus reprobationem ex praescientia humanorum demeritorum originem habuisse, nos loqui de reprobatione quatenus significat denegatam praeparationem efficacis gratiae certis personis, non quatenus denotat praeparationem aeternae poenae iisdem personis. Nam cum Aquinate libenter concedimus: Utcunque praescientia meritorum non potest esse aliqua ratio praedestinationis, quia ipsa merita praescita cadunt sub praedestinatione, tamen praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis, ex parte poenae quae praeparatur reprobis, in quantum Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata quae a seipsis habent, non a Deo. Haec Thomas Comment. in Rom. ix. lect. 2, prope finem.