Cap. VIII: Augustine rejects foresight of Esau's evil and Jacob's good alike as causes
Add Augustine — no one treated this cause more learnedly or holily: he denies as much that Esau's foresighted evil works were the cause of his reprobation as that Jacob's foresighted good works were the cause of his election. See Enchiridion to Laurentius 98, To Simplicianus 1.2, and Epistle 105, where he equally rejects those who say God hated or loved the not-yet-born because he foresaw their future works. Epistle 106 openly teaches that God by loving discerns those whom no merits discern. As he will not accept foresight of good merits as the basis for election, so he will not accept foresight of evils as the basis for reprobation. reprobation. Reprobation. For where good acts — believing, obeying, persevering tand on one side and opposite evil acts on the other, those are clearly regarded as discerned by merits. But let us come to Corvinus's sentence.
Latin
Huc etiam accedit quod Augustinus (quo nemo doctius aut sanctius hanc causam tractavit) tam negat praevisa mala opera Esavi fuisse causam quod a Deo reprobaretur, quam praevisa bona opera Jacobi negat causam fuisse quod is a Deo eligeretur. Videte Enchir. ad Laurent. cap. 98, Ad Simpl. lib. 1. quaest. 2, et Epist. 105, ubi illorum sententiam qui inquiunt Deum nondum natorum vel hunc odisse vel illum dilexisse, quia eorum futura opera praevidebat, ex aequo rejicit. Et Epist. 106 aperte docet, Deum diligendo eos discernere, quos merita nulla discernunt. Sicut igitur praevisionem bonorum meritorum non admittit causam fuisse electionis, ita nec praevisionem malorum concedit fuisse rationem reprobationis. Nam ubi ex una parte considerantur boni actus, puta credendi, obediendi, perseverandi, ex altera mali actus hisce oppositi, illos ut meritis discretos considerari perspicuum est. Sed ad Corvini sententiam veniamus.