Cap. IX Arg. 1 Resp.: wide difference of the two decrees; Major and its confirmation invalid
Between these two decrees the difference is wide. The first proceeds from vindicating justice, and so regards the sinner's final guilt as moving cause of the destined punishment. The second goes forth from God's liberty doing of his own what he wills. As when God resolves to give a special benefit to some particular person it does not follow that he regarded that person's merits as moving cause of the beneficence, so when he resolves not to give that same special benefit to another, it is not rightly deduced that he regarded that person's final demerits as moving cause of the denied beneficence. So we call the Major and its confirmation invalid: there is neither uniform consideration nor the same relation of sin to the decree of reprobating as to the decree of damning. Far from clashing with divine wisdom, it best agrees with it that God refuse to condemn anyone except for sin's demerit as antecedent moving cause of destined punishment — and yet will to reprobate some (that is, pass them by in preparing special grace and infallibly ordaining to eternal life) from mere liberty of will, not from an antecedent motive of final unbelief or impenitence.
Latin
Inter haec duo decreta latum discrimen est. Prius ex justitia vindicante procedit, ac proinde ad finalem reatum peccatoris, tanquam causam motivam supplicii destinati, respicit. Posterius ex libertate Dei de suo quod vult facientis egreditur, ac proinde, sicuti cum Deus statuit dare speciale beneficium alicui personae singulari, non inde sequitur, illum respexisse merita ejusdem personae, tanquam praedictae beneficentiae causam motivam, ita cum statuit non dare illud idem speciale beneficium alteri, non inde recte deducitur, illum ad finalia personae hujus demerita, tanquam ad causam motivam negatae hujus beneficentiae, respexisse. Majorem igitur propositionem, atque ejusdem confirmationem, invalidam esse dicimus, quia non est uniformis consideratio neque eadem habitudo peccati quoad decretum reprobandi, quae est ejusdem quoad decretum damnandi. Neque omnino repugnat, imo optime congruit, sapientiae Divinae, ut nolit quenquam condemnare nisi propter demeritum peccati tanquam causam antecedaneam et motivam supplicii destinati, et tamen velit aliquos reprobare (hoc est, in gratiae specialis praeparatione et infallibili ad vitam aeternam ordinatione praeterire) ex mera libertate suae voluntatis, et non ex antecedaneo infidelitatis aut impoenitentiae finalis motivo.