Cap. IX Arg. 8 Sol second: comparing rigor in reprobating men vs demons is inept — reprobation is denial of an undue benefit, not an act decreeing punishment
But as the saying goes, to counter-argue is not to solve — so second: when the question is whether greater rigor of justice is used in reprobating men or demons, the comparison is wholly inept if rigid justice is exercised in reprobating neither. Reprobation is denial of an undue benefit — namely of infallible ordination to eternal life through preparation and gift of special grace. So neither men's nor angels' reprobation was an act of rigid justice — not even of justice properly and formally so called — though it was not against justice (as no divine act is), and in that sense may be called most just. Inept, then, to weigh degrees of rigid justice in reprobation: mere reprobation, of men or demons, is not an act decreeing punishment (where rigor could be considered) but an act denying a benefit, where only God's liberty is to be regarded.
Latin
Verum quia, ut vulgo dici solet, contra agere non est solvere, respondemus secundo: Quando quaeritur utrum major justitiae rigor exerceatur in reprobatione hominum an Daemonum, ineptam prorsus esse comparationem, si constet rigidam justitiam neutris reprobandis exerceri. Cum igitur reprobatio sit indebiti beneficii negatio (puta infallibilis ordinationis ad vitam aeternam per specialis gratiae praeparationem et donationem) profecto nec hominum nec angelorum reprobatio fuit actus rigidae justitiae, imo ne justitiae quidem proprie et formaliter dictae; quamvis non fuerit contra justitiam, sicut nec ullus actus Divinus, et eo sensu justissima appelletur. Inepte igitur in reprobatione rigidae justitiae gradus ponderant, cum mera reprobatio, sive hominum sive daemonum, non sit actus poenam decernentis, in quo rigor possit considerari, sed actus beneficium negantis, in quo sola Dei libertas debet attendi.