Cap. X Arg. I: will to permit unbelief and deny special grace precedes absolute forescience of lasting malice — though will to punish Judas follows foresight of sin; that order is enough for our sense of reprobate
But that most firm statute of divine intellect and will — to permit certain persons' sins, and not to apply the grace by which they would be freed — must be presupposed to their foreseen impenitence, unbelief, and contumacy. Those would not be foreseen as absolutely about to be if they were not permitted. So we obtain this: however the will to punish this singular person — Judas or Cain — follows foresight of sin, the will to permit his unbelief and impenitence, and the will to deny the special grace by which he would be efficaciously bent to faith and penitence, precede that absolute forescience of malice finally to endure in him. That is enough for us. We take as reprobate the one to whom God from eternity willed to deny that freeing grace, and whom he willed to permit by his own fault to harden in his sins. On the contrary we call predestined the one for whom God from eternity willed to prepare that singular freeing grace, and whom he would not permit to harden finally in his sins.
Latin
At firmissimum hoc Divini intellectus ac voluntatis statutum de permittendis peccatis quarundam personarum, et de non-apponenda gratia qua ab iis liberarentur, praevisae earundem impoenitentiae, infidelitati et contumaciae praesupponi debet, utpote quae non praeviderentur ut absolute futurae si non permitterentur. Hoc igitur obtinimus, Quod utcunque voluntas puniendi hanc singularem personam, puta Judam aut Cainum, subsequatur peccati praevisionem, tamen voluntas permittendi infidelitatem et impoenitentiam ejusdem, ac voluntas negandi specialem gratiam, qua ad fidem et poenitentiam efficaciter flecteretur, praecedit hanc praescientiam absolutam malitiae finaliter in eadem duraturae. At hoc nobis satis est, qui illum reprobatum intelligimus, cui Deus ab aeterno denegare voluit illam gratiam qua liberaretur, et quem permittere voluit suo vitio indurescere in peccatis suis; sicut e contra illum praedestinatum dicimus, cui Deus ab aeterno praeparare voluit illam singularem gratiam qua liberaretur, quemque permittere noluit in peccatis suis finaliter indurescere.