Cap. X Arg. IV: whoever has power over the necessary antecedent has power over the consequent — if believing/not believing from free will excited by sufficient grace is the antecedent to election/reprobation, each can choose either
That is proved thus: whoever has power over the necessary antecedent also has power over the consequent that depends infallibly on it. So if believing and embracing offered grace is the necessary antecedent to election, and not believing — or finally refusing offered grace — is the antecedent to reprobation, and both hang on a free act of the human will excited by sufficient grace, what is plainer than that it lies in each one's power to be reprobated or not? Between those as contradictories no middle can be assigned.
Latin
Id inde evincitur, quia in cujus potestate est antecedens necessarium, in ejusdem etiam est consequens, quod ex eodem antecedente infallibiliter dependet: Si igitur credere, et gratiam oblatam amplecti sit antecedens necessarium ad electionem, et non credere, seu gratiam oblatam finaliter respuere sit antecedens ad reprobationem, et utrumque horum ex libero actu humanae voluntatis sufficienti gratia excitatae dependeat, quid apertius quam esse in potestate singulorum ut reprobentur vel non reprobentur, cum inter haec tanquam contradictoria medium assignari nullo modo possit?