Cap. X Ultimum Propos. 1 close toward III: Hague Colloquy grants no more than Pelagius — all stall refusing the grace that by infused faith and charity makes the good will
Last hear the Hague Colloquists: they grant infusion of divine grace as to intellect and affections, but deny such infusion in the will, as free by nature to will good or evil. In all this I see nothing credited to divine grace that Pelagius himself would not have granted. Mind’s illumination, kindling of affections, and by these a push on the will and power to will the good—Pelagius fetches from grace; but that the will becomes good by its own act without any infused gift, and is quickened by its own act, even Pelagius scarcely said so clearly. See how far Pelagius, with Pelagians and Semipelagians, and Arminius with his followers, go in owning divine grace—and see them all stuck at the same mark, refusing the most efficacious grace that, faith and charity inspired, makes the good will, and admitting only the grace that makes the will able to become good by its own doing, if it wills to be good by doing well.
Latin
Ultimo in loco Collocutores Hagienses audiantur, qui infusionem Divinae gratiae agnoscunt quidem quoad intellectum et affectus, in voluntate autem negant istiusmodi infusionem locum habere, ut quae natura sua libera sit ad volendum bonum vel malum. In hisce omnibus nihil video gratiae Divinae tribui quod Pelagius ipse non concessisset. Illam mentis illuminationem et affectuum accensionem, et hisce mediantibus propulsionem voluntatis, et potentiam ad bonum volendum, a gratia arcessit Pelagius; Verum, actione sua (absque omni dono infuso) bonam fieri, et vivificari voluntatem sua propria actione, vix tam clare asseveravit ipse Pelagius. Videtis jam quousque in agnitione gratiae Divinae processit Pelagius, cum Pelagianis et Semipelagianis, Arminius etiam cum sectatoribus suis: videtis etiam eos omnes ad eandem metam haerere, neque velle admittere illam efficacissimam gratiam, qua inspirata fide et charitate voluntatem bonam facit, sed illam solummodo, qua potens redditur ut sua actione bona evadat, si ipsa velit esse bona, agendo bene.