On the Soul against the Philosophers · §3 · Eustathius of Antioch

Infants lack mind, so souls are not unbegotten

Click or tap any sentence to jump there. The side buttons skip a paragraph.

Eustathius is addressing the Pythagoreans and Platonists, arguing from the observable condition of newborn infants that souls are not unbegotten.

For if children at the very moment of birth had been attached to complete wisdom, it would perhaps be possible for some to feign folly. But if they are lacking in mind and reason and understanding, then souls have not been established as unbegotten in nature. We all know, then, that the soul has been stretched out together with the masses of the body—not only in the size or smallness of its limbs, but also in the other irrationalities of the disposition. As long as these infants are newly formed, these infants are at a loss for every thought everywhere and for counsel. But as they advance little by little and gradually, it takes on mind and wisdom and reason in addition.

Greek

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἅμα τῷ τεχθῆναι τὰ παιδία, τελείας ἐξῆπτο φρονήσεως, ἐξῆν ἴσως ὑποκρίνεσθαί τινας ἄνοιαν· εἰ δὲ λείπεται νοῦ καὶ λόγου καὶ

συνέσεως, οὐκ ἄρα καθέστηκαν ἀγέννητοι τὴν φύσιν αἱ ψυχαί. Σύμπαντες οὖν ἴσμεν, ὅτι τοῖς τῶν σωμάτων ὄγκοις ἡ ψυχὴ συνεκτέταται, διαρκῶς οὐ μεγέθει μόνον ἢ βραχύτητι μελῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τῆς γνώμης ἀλογίαις· ἐς ὅσον μὲν νεόπλαστα τυγχάνει ταῦτα τὰ βρέφη, πάσης μὲν πανταχῶς ἐννοίας ἀπορεῖ καὶ βουλῆς· ἡρέμα δὲ καὶ κατ' ὀλίγον προϊόντα νοῦν τε καὶ φρόνησιν προσλαμβάνει καὶ λόγον.

Report a mistake in this passage