To Florus 1.101

Although you are consistent in no respect, let the sensible reader consider what you have advanced. Let us agree that a will unable to will good can be called free. You assert that this will is freed in baptism. I ask: in what way is it freed? Is it compelled always to will good and unable to will evil? Or can it desire either? If you answer, “It is compelled always to will good”, you yourself recognize how much of a Jovinianist you are. If, however, you say, “How can a will be free if it is compelled always to will good?”, I answer, “How was it called free before, if it was compelled to will only evil?” If you therefore reply that after baptism the will becomes free in the sense that it can both sin and refrain from sin, you thereby declare that there was no free choice when it could not do both. You are enclosed on every side by the snares of your own argument. If choice was free before baptism, it had the capacity to do good just as it had the capacity to do evil; and the whole stage set of your doctrine, by which you urge an evil inherent in nature, collapses.