To Florus 3.32

Suppose, for example, the question concerns Goliath’s complexion, and one person insists he was black and another that he was white (compare 1 Samuel 17:4–5). These opposing opinions can both be false, but they cannot both be true. It cannot be true that he was black if he was always white, or that he was white if he remained black throughout his life. Thus these two opinions, which cannot both be true, can both be false if his complexion was neither white nor black but tawny—or a moderate blend of the opposites, with whiteness softened but no full blackness introduced. Differing and opposed descriptions can therefore be denied together more readily than affirmed together.

But opposites without a middle, such as good and evil, just and unjust, innocence and guilt, cannot coexist at one time in one and the same subject; so affirming either necessarily denies the other. For example, a command, advice, or assistance cannot be both just and unjust at the same time. Equally, a person cannot at one and the same time be both guilty and innocent, both good and evil.