They add that the agent must act from counsel and reason, not mere impulse of nature
They do not mean, though, that everything that acts of its own accord and without compulsion acts freely. They grant that animals act of their own accord, yet they deny them freedom.
So for freedom they also require that the agent not simply be driven by nature's impulse but act from deliberation and reason. On their view, then, the full definition of freedom is exemption from compulsion in an agent who acts on the judgement of reason.
Latin
V. Nec tamen eorum mens est quaecunque sponte, & non coacta agunt, agentia esse libera. Agnoscunt enim bruta sponte agere, & ea nihilominus libertate spoliant. Itaque ad libertatem praeterea requirunt, ut qui agit non simpliciter naturae impulsu ducatur; sed ex consilio & ratione agat. Adeoque ex eorum mente, plena libertatis definitio erit, siquis dicat illam esse immunitatem a coactione in eo qui agit ex rationis judicio.