Others oppose liberty also to natural necessity, determination by matter or by sense
Others state plainly and precisely that the freedom by which man is called free in acting is not exemption from compulsion alone, compulsion being the necessity imposed by an outside agent's force against the inclination of the thing compelled. That freedom, they say, is also opposed to natural necessity, that is, to being fixed by nature on one outcome.
This natural necessity, on their account, comes from matter, and in two ways. In one, the outward action does not depend on any inner act that commands it. Once the faculty is there and a material object is brought to it from outside, the action must take place, and with just this character and this strength. Everything without sense and reason is subject to this necessity.
In the other, the outward action does depend on an inner command, so that it can be held back and need not always happen the same way, yet what settles it comes only from something material. That is the case with animals. Their outward actions depend on sense and are directed by it, and they vary a great deal even toward one and the same object as their senses are affected in different ways, inwardly and outwardly. But their senses themselves are always moved and settled by some material object.
Man is free of both kinds of necessity. In the acts for which he is said to have free choice, he is not settled in acting by matter brought to him from outside, or even by material sense alone. Being an intellectual agent, he acts and desires on the judgement and command of reason.
Latin
IX. Alii vero diserte & distincte affirmant, libertatem illam a qua homo liber in agendo dicitur, non esse immunitatem a sola coactione, quae est necessitas quam infert vis agentis externi, contra inclinationem illius quod cogi dicitur: sed libertatem illam opponi praeterea necessitati naturali, sive determinationi per naturam ad unum. Porro necessitas illa, quam naturalem vocant, a materia juxta ipsos oritur, idque duplici modo. Vel enim actio externa non dependet ab ulla actione interna a qua imperetur: sed posita facultate, & objecto materiali extrinsecus admoto, non potest non exerceri actio, & quidem talis, tantaque. Cui necessitati subjiciuntur, quaecunque sensu & ratione carent. Vel pendet quidem actio externa ab internae imperio, ut & suspendi possit, & non eodem modo semper fieri, sed tamen non nisi a re aliqua materiali determinatio oritur: sicuti contingit in brutis, quorum actiones externae a sensu pendent atque imperantur, & magnam varietatem, etiam circa unum & idem objectum admittunt, prout sensus eorum varie, tum interne, tum externe afficiuntur; sed ipsi eorum sensus ab objecto aliquo materiali semper moventur & determinantur. Homo vero ab utraque ista necessitatis specie immunis est. Nec enim in actibus illis, quorum respectu dicitur liberi esse arbitrii, a materia externe admota, aut etiam a solo materiali sensu in agendo determinatur. Sed cum sit agens intellectualis, agit atque appetit ex judicio atque imperio rationis.