Amyraut distinguishes motions of the will that follow deliberation from those that do not
Moses Amyraut, until recently professor at the Academy of Saumur, teaches much the same on this point in his treatise On Man's Free Choice (p. 61 and following). He first distinguishes two movements of the will.
One is not cut off from the knowledge that has its source in reason, but the knowledge from which it springs and grows did not itself come out of any prior weighing. The other is not only joined with knowledge but arises from knowledge that consultation (probouleusis) went before. That knowledge is simply the conclusion reached by deliberation, when several objects are considered and compared, or one and the same object is looked at in different ways, so that the mind, swung this way and that for a while by the weight of reasons, finally leans to one side.
Next he observes that the movement of the will that follows no weighing or deliberation by the mind is itself of two kinds. By one the will is carried toward the end, namely happiness and blessedness itself; by the other toward the means thought to lead to that end.
Latin
XIV. Similis est hac in parte Doctrina Mosis Amyraldi nuper in Academia Salmuriensi Professoris Tractatu de libero hominis arbitrio, p. 61. & seqq. Ubi primo distinguit duplicem voluntatis motionem. Unam quae non est sejuncta quidem ab ea cognitione quae a ratione ducit originem, sed est istiusmodi tamen ut cognitio ex qua nascitur ac efflorescit, non sit ipsa orta ex praevia consultatione: alteram quae non modo conjuncta est cum aliqua cognitione, sed nascitur ex ea notitia quam προβούλευσις, i. e. consultatio antecessit, & quae nihil aliud est quam Conclusio quae ex deliberatione conficitur, consideratis, scilicet, atque comparatis inter se pluribus objectis, aut uno & eodem objecto spectato diversimode, adeo ut mens aliquandiu hinc & illinc rationum librata ponderibus, tandem in unam partem inclinetur. Deinde observat illam voluntatis motionem, quae nullam mentis consultationem & deliberationem sequitur, adhuc duplicem esse, nimirum voluntatem per unam in finem, id est, beatitudinem & felicitatem ipsam ferri; per alteram in media quae ad finem istum ducere existimantur.