Strict free choice concerns means and what is in our power, and includes indifference
Freedom in the stricter sense, or free choice, is by their own admission limited to means directed to the end, or to things that contribute little or nothing to it. It concerns ta eph' hemin, the things in our power, and Aristotle rightly defines it as the spontaneous arising from prior deliberation, or deliberative desire for things in our power.
In this sense acts are called free when they are purely contingent and we can do them or not do them as we choose. Taken so, freedom includes a kind of indifference. The will is free only in so far as it is indifferent, that is, able to act or not act toward the same object, and able to choose this, or something else, or its opposite.
In this sense God does not love himself freely, since he wills and loves himself by the necessity of his nature. Nor does man freely want to be happy and not want to be miserable, since he wills this, and cannot will otherwise, by a natural necessity.
Latin
XXIII. Strictius vero usurpata libertas, sive liberum arbitrium restringitur, ipsis fatentibus ad media relata ad finem, aut ad ea quae parum, aut nihil ad finem conducunt, & versatur circa τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, id est, circa ea quae sunt in nostra potestate, & recte ab Aristotele definitur spontaneum ex praevia deliberatione ortum, sive Deliberativa appetitio eorum quae sunt in nostra potestate. Quo in sensu liberi actus dicuntur qui sunt mere contingentes, & qui a nobis pro arbitrio fieri possunt, aut non fieri. Eoque respectu libertas includit quandam indifferentiam, neque aliter voluntas libera est quam quatenus est indifferens, nempe, cum possit circa idem objectum agere, vel non agere, & cum possit tam illud, quam aliud, aut ejus oppositum eligere. Et hoc sensu Deus libere se non amat, quia naturae necessitate seipsum vult & amat; nec etiam homo libere vult esse foelix, & non vult esse miser, quia sic vult & non aliter per naturalem quandam necessitatem.