Amyraut: the practical intellect is the source of free action only when it judges after deliberation
He does not, however, make the intellect the source of freedom in man however it is taken, but only in so far as it pronounces on what is to be done or desired, not only in general but in the particular case, and so as to drive a man to act or hold him back from acting. In that respect it is called the practical intellect, which dictates in each particular matter what is to be done or not done, sought or shunned, here and now.
Even then he does not think any judgement of the practical intellect is enough for free action. He requires a judgement that is the conclusion of weighing and deliberation. On his view, then, the practical intellect is not the source of free actions in man in just any way, but only when it judges what to do probouleutos, that is, after deliberation and weighing have taken place. This can be seen in the section cited, p. 31 and following.
Latin
XLI. Intellectum autem quovis modo consideratum non vult esse principium libertatis in homine, sed tantum quatenus de rebus agendis, aut appetendis pronunciat: neque id solum in genere, sed etiam in singulari; & ita ut hominem ad agendum impellat, aut ab actione retrahat: quo respectu vocatur intellectus practicus: qui, scilicet, dictat in rebus singulis, quid jam, hic & nunc agendum, aut non agendum, appetendum, aut fugiendum sit. Nec tamen adhuc ad libere agendum, judicium quodvis intellectus practici sufficere existimat: sed requirit judicium tale quod sit conclusio consultationis, & deliberationis. Adeo ut, ex ejus mente, intellectus practicus quovis modo & simpliciter in homine non sit principium actionum liberarum; sed tantum quatenus de rebus agendis judicat προβουλεύτως, id est, habita prius deliberatione, & consultatione: sicuti videre est sect. citata pag. 31. & seqq.