Le Blanc: freedom is formally neither in intellect nor will but in the man acting through both
My own view is rather that freedom is formally neither in the intellect nor in the will, but in man as he acts through intellect and will. Freedom, properly speaking, is not a disposition of this faculty or that. It arises from the mutual relation and joint working of several faculties, and so it cannot properly be ascribed to any one faculty, only to the subject (suppositum) in which those faculties are found.
Strictly speaking, then, neither mind nor will should be called free, but man himself, in so far as he uses those faculties in a certain way. When the will is called free, the statement is not, in the language of the schools, formal but causal: the will, joined to the intellect, is the cause of the actions for which man is said to act freely.
This point is not idle, as will appear later. It helps to resolve certain difficulties in which a good many entangle themselves by looking for the whole nature of freedom in the will rather than in the man as such.
Latin
XLVI. Sed mihi potius dicendum videtur neque in intellectu, neque in voluntate libertatem esse formaliter, sed in homine quatenus per intellectum & voluntatem agit. Siquidem libertas proprie loquendo, non est affectio hujus, aut illius facultatis, sed aliquid oriens ex plurium facultatum relatione mutua & concursu; & quod proinde nulli certae facultati proprie attribui potest, sed solum supposito in quo facultates illae reperiuntur. Itaque si exacte loquamur, nec mens, nec voluntas liberae dicendae sunt, sed homo ipse quatenus facultatibus illis certo modo utitur. Quum vero voluntas libera vocatur, enunciatio non est, ut Scholae loquuntur, formalis, sed causalis: quia, scilicet, voluntas intellectui juncta, causa est actionum, quarum respectu homo libere agere dicitur. Quae observatio non est omnino de nihilo, ut in sequentibus videri poterit. Facit enim ad solvendas quasdam difficultates quibus se implicant non pauci, dum totam libertatis rationem in voluntate, non simpliciter in homine quaerunt.