What these doctors mean: compulsion alone destroys freedom in one who acts by rational judgment
As the passages already quoted readily show, these teachers say that freedom of choice is opposed not to necessity as such but to compulsion. They do not mean, as their opponents seem to assume, that the nature and essence of freedom is simply exemption from compulsion.
They admit that many things act without being forced and yet do not act freely, for in their view nothing is a free agent unless it acts on the judgment of the intellect.
Their point is narrower. In one who acts on the judgment of reason, compulsion alone destroys freedom, and necessity does not. No one can act under force and freely at the same time, but someone can act freely even though he acts necessarily.
Latin
XXII. Caeterum Doctores illi, ut facile colligi potest ex illis ipsis quae hactenus citata sunt, quando affirmant libertatem Arbitrii oppositam esse, non necessitati simpliciter, sed potius coactioni, per id significatum nolunt, naturam & essentiam libertatis consistere in eo quod agens est a coactione immune, ut supponere videntur qui contra eos disputant. Fatentur enim multa agere non coacte, neque tamen libere. Quippe nullum agens ipsis liberum est nisi illud quod agit ex intellectus judicio. Sed istud tantum sibi volunt in eo qui agit ex judicio rationis, solam coactionem libertatem perimere, non vero necessitatem. Et esse quidem impossibile ut quis simul coacte, & tamen libere agat; sed posse fieri ut aliquis agat libere, quanquam necessario.