Whoever acts on a sure judgment of reason acts freely, necessarily or contingently; Bonaventure and Scotus
They consider that anyone acting on a settled judgment of reason acts freely, whether he acts necessarily or contingently.
He always acts and seeks under his own command. He wills a thing in such a way that he wills himself to will it, and so approves his own will, turning back on it silently or openly. In this way, in the very act of willing he moves and rules himself, as Bonaventure puts it in the passage cited above.
Or, in Scotus's words, 'the will, through the firmness of its freedom, lays necessity on itself in bringing forth its act and in persevering in it, that is, in fixing itself on the act.' (Quodlibet 16.)
Latin
XXV. Illum autem qui ex certo rationis judicio agit, sive necessario, sive contingenter agat, existimant agere libere, quoniam semper agit & appetit ad sui ipsius imperium, & sic vult aliquid ut velit se velle illud, suam ipsius voluntatem probans, dum tacite vel expresse supra ipsam reflectitur, & ita in actu volendi seipsum movet, & sibi dominatur, ut loquitur Bonaventura loco super citato. Vel quia, ut ait Scotus, Voluntas propter firmitatem libertatis suae, sibi ipsi necessitatem imponit in eliciendo actum, & in perseverando, sive figendo se in actum. Quodlib. 16.