The 'three columns': Jansenists accept a sense of the third condemned proposition, yet require freedom from necessity
In the paper they call 'of the three columns', where they separate the different senses of the five well-known propositions condemned by the popes Innocent X and Alexander VII, they assign to the third proposition the following sense as sound and accepted by them.
'To merit and demerit in the state of fallen nature, man does not need freedom from the necessity of infallibility. Freedom from compulsion together with the judgment of reason is enough, if one considers strictly the essence of freedom and of merit. Yet given the condition of that state, there is always an indifference of power by which the will, even under grace that is proximately necessary and efficacious of itself, is able not to will, though never so as not to will while under that same grace.'
Here they grant that in the state of fallen nature indifference of the will always goes with freedom.
That is why, in the articles presented to the bishop of Comminges, they do not hesitate to say: 'To merit and demerit in the state of fallen nature, freedom from compulsion is not enough; freedom from necessity is required. For although grace efficacious of itself determines the will to act infallibly and irresistibly, so that the will never actually dissents from it, it does not bring in necessity, since it does not remove the power of dissenting.'
Latin
XXXVI. In illo vero scripto quod vocant trium columnarum, ubi distinguunt varios sensus quinque famosarum propositionum, quas damnarunt Pontifices Romani Innocentius X. & Alexander VII. tertiae propositioni hunc sensum tanquam bonum & sibi probatum tribuunt. Ad merendum & demerendum, in statu naturae lapsae, non requiritur in homine libertas a necessitate infallibilitatis, sed sufficit Libertas a coactione cum judicio rationis, si consideretur praecise essentia libertatis & meriti, quanquam ex ratione status semper reperiatur indifferentia potentiae, qua voluntas, etiam sub gratia proxime necessaria & ex se efficaci potest non velle, non tamen ut unquam simul cum eadem gratia non velit. Ubi agnoscunt semper in statu naturae lapsae, Libertati adjunctam esse voluntatis indifferentiam. Et propterea in articulis illis Convenarum Episcopo oblatis, non verentur dicere, Quod ad merendum & demerendum in statu naturae lapsae non sufficit Libertas a coactione; sed requiritur libertas a necessitate. Quamvis enim, inquiunt, gratia per se efficax infallibiliter & insuperabiliter voluntatem ad agendum determinet, atque ita nunquam voluntas illi actu dissentiat; non tamen inducit necessitatem, quia non tollit dissentiendi potestatem.