On the nature of freedom: whether it opposes necessity or only compulsion is a verbal or minor dispute
On the nature of freedom, as the earlier disputations also make clear, opinion varies no less in both schools. First, we showed at length that in each school some teach, against the protests of others, that freedom of choice is opposed not to necessity as such but only to compulsion.
We also showed that the dispute here is either a mere matter of words or at least of little weight. Those who say that freedom in general is opposed only to compulsion, not to necessity, concede to theologians of the other view that being free from compulsion is not enough for freedom and is not, properly, what freedom consists in. It consists rather in the free agent's moving and acting itself, in a way peculiar to an intelligent agent and found neither in lifeless things nor in animals.
Latin
VI. Quod spectat autem naturam libertatis, ut clarum etiam est ex iis quae praecedentibus disputationibus exposita fuerunt, non minor est in utraque Schola sententiarum varietas. Et primo quidem abunde probavimus, tam in hac, quam in illa Schola non deesse qui doceant, aliis reclamantibus, libertatem arbitrii oppositam non esse necessitati simpliciter, sed coactioni tantum. Verum illud quoque manifestum fecimus, quae hic est controversia, aut mere verbalem esse, aut saltem non magni momenti. Etenim qui affirmant libertatem in genere opponi non necessitati, sed coactioni solum, diversae sententiae Theologis concedunt, ad libertatem non sufficere immunitatem a coactione; nec libertatem in ea proprie consistere; sed in eo quod agens liberum seipsum movet & seipsum agit, ratione quadam agenti intellectuali propria, quae nec in rebus inanimis, neque in brutis reperitur.