Conclusion: freedom is wrongly placed in a power not to act even in the composite sense
There is, then, a divine grace, shared indeed by all the elect, whose motion and impulse a person's conversion follows infallibly and surely; and yet everyone agrees that a person's conversion to God is a free act of the will.
It is clear, therefore, that freedom is wrongly located in the will's always being able, with everything required for acting in place, including grace's ordinary motion, as much not to act as to act, and that not only in the divided sense but also in the composite sense, so that grace's motion could coexist with the absence of the act toward which it moves a person.
Latin
XLII. Cum ergo sit quaedam divina gratia, & quidem electis omnibus communis, ad cujus motionem atque impulsionem hominis conversio infallibiliter & certo consequitur; & tamen omnium consensu conversio hominis ad Deum sit liber voluntatis actus: planum est libertatem in eo male constitui, quod positis omnibus ad agendum praerequisitis ipsaque ordinaria gratiae motione, voluntas semper possit tam non agere quam agere, non tantum in sensu diviso sed in sensu quoque composito, ita ut cum illa gratiae motione conjungi possit carentia actus ad quem hominem movet.