Bellarmine: the divine motion is received according to the will's negative determination (De Lib. Arb. IV.16)
To resolve that difficulty Bellarmine says that God's influence or power, by which the will is moved and applied to its work, is received in secondary causes according to their disposition.
For Bellarmine the disposition according to which God's motion is received in the will is simply a kind of negative determination that comes before both God's influence and the will's elicited act. In his sense it consists in the will's letting itself be moved by the object that reason sets before it, or not letting itself be moved by it. He calls the determination negative because it lies not in a positive act but in the absence of one, though the will is no less free to act than not to act.
This, he thinks, is how the will is truly free and determines itself even though God moves it and applies it to its work: God's motion itself is in the will's power. 'If it lets itself be moved by the object set before it,' he says, 'God applies it and moves it to produce the act; if it does not, God neither applies it nor moves it. God freely bound himself to this when he created a free will.' (De libero arbitrio, book 4, chapter 16.)
Latin
XIV. Bellarminus ut difficultatem illam solvat, dicit influxum, seu Virtutem Dei, qua Voluntas movetur & applicatur ad opus, recipi in causis secundis secundum illarum dispositionem. Illa vero dispositio secundum quam recipitur in Voluntate motus Dei, Bellarmino nihil aliud est quam negativa quaedam determinatio praecedens tum influxum Dei, tum actum elicitum Voluntatis. Nimirum illa ex ejus sensu, in eo consistit quod Voluntas sinat se moveri ab objecto per rationem ipsi proposito, vel ab eo se moveri non sinat. Quam determinationem dicit esse negativam, quia non consistit in actu positivo, sed in negatione actus; cum tamen Voluntas non minus sit libera ut agat, quam ut non agat. Unde fieri putat ut Voluntas sit vere libera, & ipsa se determinet, tametsi Deus illam moveat & applicet ad opus, quia, scilicet, ipsa Dei motio in ejus potestate est. Nam, inquit, si se moveri sinat ab objecto proposito, Deus eam applicat & movet ad actum eliciendum: si non sinat, Deus eam non applicat neque movet: ad hoc, scilicet, Deus se libere obligavit, quando liberam Voluntatem creavit. De Liber. Arbitr. lib. 4. cap. 16.