Josue de la Place declines to define the dependence of secondary causes on the first
Josué de la Place, a most learned and very subtle theologian, agrees with the other theologians that the will in acting depends on God as on the first cause, as other secondary causes do. But being a modest man he does not venture to define what that dependence is or how great it is, and he declines to give his judgment on the various questions about God's concurrence and cooperation with all secondary causes that are commonly debated in the Schools.
These are his words: 'The will depends on God as on the first cause, on which all secondary causes depend in acting. How far secondary causes depend on the first cause in their causing is fiercely disputed among the papists. That God concurs with every cause, so that it acts in keeping with its faculties, is admitted by all. But nearly all of them maintain that this concurrence is immediate, proximate, and simply the same as the action of the secondary causes themselves, though some others object. And over that very immediate concurrence the Dominicans and the Jesuits fight each other stubbornly with all their might, the former for what they call physical predetermination, the latter strenuously opposing it. For our part, out of the reverence we owe to God's infinite majesty, we do not venture to define how great the dependence of the secondary cause on the first is. It is enough for us that, provided it does not cast on God even the slightest stain of our sins, it cannot be made too great' (Treatise on free choice, p. 174).
Latin
LII. Josue Placeus vero Theologus Doctissimus, atque subtilissimus, cum Theologis reliquis, agnoscit quidem voluntatem in agendo, ut alias causas secundas, a Deo dependere, tanquam a prima causa; quae autem & quanta sit illa dependentia, pro sua modestia definire non audet, nec vult judicium suum interponere super variis illis quaestionibus, quae de Dei concursu, & cooperatione cum omnibus causis secundis in Scholis agitari solent. Haec enim sunt illius verba, Voluntas pendet a Deo, ut a prima causa, a qua causae secundae omnes in agendo dependent. Quanta autem sit causarum secundarum in causando dependentia a prima causa, disputatur acriter inter Pontificios. Concurrere quidem cum omni causa, ut convenienter facultatibus suis operetur, in confesso est apud omnes. Sed hunc concursum pleriq; omnes immediatum, proximum, ac eundem plane cum ipsa actione causarum secundarum esse contendunt, aliis quibusdam reclamantibus. Deque illo ipso concursu immediato inter se obnixe totis viribus Dominicani, & Jesuitae digladiantur: illis pro Physica quam vocant praedeterminatione, his contra illam fortiter pugnantibus. Nos quidem qua reverentia erga infinitam Dei majestatem ducimur, non audemus definire quanta sit dependentia causae secundae a prima. Nobis sufficit, modo ne Deo ullam peccatorum nostrorum vel minimam labem aspergat, non posse nimiam statui. Tractatu de liber. Arbitr. p. 174.