Bellarmine: God sees free acts in the human will, knowing its propensities and all that may meet it
Bellarmine comes close to this view. 'It seems probable to us,' he says, 'that God sees future free actions only in the human will.' A little later he adds: 'God knows perfectly all the inclinations and the whole temper of our mind. He is not unaware of everything that can present itself to it in each deliberation. Finally, he sees clearly what is most fitting and suitable to move such a mind, endowed with such an inclination and temper. Because of all this he infers without fail which way the mind will lean.'
He goes on to say that in the contingent cause, considered strictly by itself, there is no determination. Suppose, however, that someone takes the contingent or free cause together with everything that can present itself and get in the way. Suppose too that he sees the inclinations and aptitudes both of the cause and of all the objects and circumstances, which God alone can do. Then some determination will result, and because of it one will be able to say truly, 'This will happen at such a time.' On Grace and Free Choice, book 4, chapter 15, in the reply to the sixth argument.
Latin
XXXV. Ad hanc sententiam accedit Bellarminus. Probabile, inquit, nobis videtur, Deum futuras actiones liberas non videre nisi in humana voluntate. Et paulo post, Deus igitur quia perfecte cognoscit omnes propensiones, & totum ingenium animi nostri, & rursum non ignorat omnia, quae illi possunt occurrere in singulis deliberationibus, & denique perspectum habet, quid magis congruum & aptum sit, ut moveat talem animum, tali propensione & ingenio praeditum, infallibiliter colligit, quam in partem sit animus inclinaturus. Quibus subjungit in ipsa contingente causa praecise considerata, nullam esse determinationem: sed tamen si quis conjungat cum causa contingente, vel libera, omnia quae possunt occurrere & impedire, & videat propensiones & aptitudines tum ipsius causae, tum omnium objectorum & circumstantiarum, quod solus Deus facere potest, existet inde aliqua determinatio, & ratione illius verum erit dicere, hoc erit tali tempore. De gratia & libero Arbitrio lib. 4. cap. 15. Responsione ad sextum argumentum.