Le Blanc's view, first: no conditional free future is knowable unless the condition includes God's decree not to deny concurrence
To state briefly what I myself think: first, it is certain and, as is clear from what has been said, granted by everyone, that nothing is freely future under any condition, or can be known as such, unless God's decree not to deny the creature the concurrence necessary for acting is included in the condition under which it is said to be future.
That is, if any proposition about conditional futures is to be capable of truth, it must be explained and understood like this: this or that creature, placed in such an order of things, will do this or that, provided God wills to concur with it as he usually does. He must concur if the creature is to be able to put forth its action.
Latin
XLV. Ut autem quid ipse quoque sentio paucis aperiam, Primo illud certum est &, ut patet ex dictis, ab omnibus concessum, Nihil esse sub ulla conditione libere futurum, & ut tale cognosci posse, nisi in conditione sub qua futurum dicitur, includatur Dei decretum de non denegando creaturae concursu ad agendum necessario. Nempe propositiones omnes de futuris conditionatis, ut verae esse possint, sic exponendae & intelligendae sunt; creatura haec, vel illa in tali rerum ordine constituta, hoc aut illud faciet; modo Deus velit cum ea concurrere, prout concurrere solet, & ut concurrat necesse est ad hoc ut creatura actionem suam elicere possit.