Objection that nothing is future before God's decree: absolute futurity needs a decree, conditional futurity only a supposed one
Someone may object that nothing is future except in dependence on God's decree. Before God's decree, then, a thing is no more future than not future, but open to being either, so that neither can truly be said of it.
My answer is this. For a thing to be absolutely future, some decree of God on which its futurity depends is indeed required beforehand. But for a thing not to be simply future, only future under some condition, no decree actually present in God is needed. It is enough that there be a decree that would have to be posited in God on that hypothesis.
Latin
XLVIII. Quod si quis dicat nihil futurum esse, nisi dependenter a Dei decreto; & sic ante decretum Dei, rem non esse magis futuram quam non futuram, sed indifferentem ad hoc, ut futura vel non futura sit; adeoque neutrum de ea vere affirmari posse: Respondeo ad hoc, ut res absolute futura sit, praerequiri quidem quoddam Dei decretum, a quo pendeat ejus futuritio: sed ad hoc ut res non sit simpliciter futura, sed tantum futura esset sub aliqua conditione, non requiri decretum quod actu in Deo sit; sed sufficere decretum quod, juxta hypothesin, in Deo ponendum esset.