Twisse's argument from eternal futurity; reply: futurity is only a relation of reason, an extrinsic denomination
'But,' says that learned man, 'no cause can be given for a futurity that existed from eternity unless the cause itself existed from eternity. Nothing temporal causes what exists from eternity. But nothing existed from eternity except God himself, who acts outside himself only through his free will.'
My answer is that this argument assumes that futurity is something real, distinct from the future thing itself and having a cause other than that thing. That is entirely false. Futurity is nothing but a certain relation of reason, an extrinsic denomination of the thing said to be future. It is not some being distinct from the future thing that needs a cause different from the cause of the future thing itself.
The argument itself makes this plain. It rightly assumes that nothing existed from eternity except God. So the futurity said to have existed from eternity was either nothing real or God himself.
Latin
LVI. At, inquit, Doctus ille vir, futuritionis quae ab aeterno fuit nulla causa dari potest quae ab aeterno non fuerit. Nihil enim temporale causa est ejus quod ab aeterno est. Sed nihil ab aeterno fuit praeter Deum ipsum, qui non nisi per liberam suam voluntatem ad extra operatur. Respondeo, argumentum istud supponit futuritionem esse aliquid reale a re ipsa futura distinctum, & quod causam aliam habeat quam res ipsa futura. At hoc falsissimum est. Nam futuritio nihil aliud est quam respectus quidam rationis, & extrinseca denominatio rei quae futura dicitur: non vero ens aliquod a re futura distinctum, & quod requirat causam quandam diversam ab ipsius rei futurae causa. Et hoc patet ex ipso argumento. Nam recte ponit argumentum ab aeterno nihil fuisse praeter Deum: ac proinde futuritio quae ab aeterno fuisse dicitur, vel nihil reale fuit, vel fuit ipse Deus.