Theological Theses · §2094 · Louis Le Blanc de Beaulieu

Nor does Vasquez side with those who put absolute foreknowledge of the will's determination before God's decree to concur

Yet he does not join those who think God absolutely foreknows what the will is going to determine itself to before he decrees to concur with it in this or that act, and before he in any way foreordains its act. His reason is that he judges it impossible for our will to act or determine itself prior in nature to God's acting with it. It follows that not even in eternity can the will's determination be understood apart from God's decree to concur with it.

A further reason is that this view seems to take something away from God's cooperating grace. 'Our will,' he says, 'needs for acting not only to be aroused but also the cooperation of grace in order to consent to that arousing. So it will need that cooperation in order to determine itself to consent as well. How then can it be understood as determined at some prior moment without the cooperation of grace?'

Latin

XXXIV. Non tamen ad eos accedit, qui putant Deum absolute praescire ad quid voluntas se determinatura sit, priusquam decernat cum illa concurrere ad hunc aut illum actum, & actum ejus ulla ratione praefiniat. Idque quia judicat impossibile esse, voluntatem nostram prius natura operari, aut se determinare, quam Deus cum illa operetur. Unde sequitur, nec in aeternitate intelligi posse illius determinationem, sine decreto Dei concurrendi cum illa. Et praeterea quoniam haec opinio aliquid gratiae Dei cooperanti derogare videtur, Cum enim, inquit, voluntas nostra non tantum indigeat ad operandum excitatione, sed etiam cooperatione gratiae, ut consentiat excitationi: indigebit etiam ut se determinet ad consensum: quomodo ergo in aliquo priori intelligitur determinata sine gratiae cooperatione?

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