Yet many acts not evil are left to free option, and are predefined only respectively, with regard to the will's determination
Even so, he thinks that for many acts which are not evil in themselves, men's wills are not absolutely predetermined by God in time; they are left a free option between two or more alternatives, all of them lawful.
Likewise he does not think that all acts of the will, even those without the character of sin, were absolutely predefined by God in his eternal decrees. They were predefined, in his phrase, only 'respectively': not before and apart from considering how the created will would determine itself, but with regard to that determination.
Latin
X. Veruntamen ut putat voluntatem hominum ad multos actus etiam ex se non malos, absolute a Deo in tempore non praedeterminari, sed liberam ipsi optionem permitti, ex duobus aut pluribus, quae utraque aut omnia sunt licita; sic etiam non putat omnes voluntatis actus, etiam qui peccati rationem non habent, fuisse absolute a Deo praedefinitos in aeternis ipsius decretis: sed, ut loquitur, respective solum; quia scilicet, praedefiniti non sunt ante & citra considerationem determinationis voluntatis creatae, sed cum respectu ad eam.