Decrees of permission and respective decrees leave the will free in both senses
The decrees of God by which he permits evils to be done, or by which he predefined certain acts of the will not absolutely but only respectively, leave the will free, on his view, not only in the first and broader sense but also in the second and stricter one. Prior to the will's own determination they do not take from it the indifference to act or not act.
God's permission leaves the will in a state where it can do or not do what is permitted. And what God decreed respectively was not, as already said, predefined before and apart from considering how the will itself would determine itself. This is set out at greater length in Strang, book 2, chapter 8.
Latin
XV. Caeterum decreta Dei quibus mala fieri permittit, aut quosdam voluntatis actus non absolute sed tantum respective praedefinivit, voluntatem, juxta ipsum, liberam sinunt non solum priori & latiori sensu, sed etiam sensu illo posteriori atque strictiori, quia nempe antecedenter ad voluntatis ipsius determinationem, ab ea non auferunt indifferentiam ut agat vel non agat. Si quidem Dei permissio in eo statu voluntatem relinquit, ut possit quod permittitur agere vel non agere: quae vero sunt a Deo respective decreta, non, ut jam dictum est, praedefinita sunt ante & citra considerationem determinationis ipsius voluntatis, quae prolixius exposita videre est apud eundem Strangium lib. 2. c. 8.