Free acts are necessary only on the decree's hypothesis and by infallibility; freedom and necessity do not clash
With these distinctions in place, they say that what free and contingent causes do does indeed come about necessarily with respect to the divine decree. But it does so not absolutely, only on the hypothesis of that decree; and the necessity is not one of coercion but only of infallibility, because God foreordained that these things should be done.
This kind of necessity, they say, does not remove the freedom of second causes but rather secures it, since it is not freedom and necessity that cancel each other out but freedom and coercion.
'For,' they say, 'God's decree makes it necessary not only that a contingent and free cause act, but also that it act contingently and freely. By his decree God determined not only each event but also its mode and manner.'
Latin
XXXII. His positis distinctionibus, dicunt ea quae fiunt a causis liberis & contingentibus necessario quidem evenire, respectu decreti divini, verum non absolute sed solum ex decreti illius hypothesi; nec eam necessitatem esse coactionis sed tantum infallibilitatis, quia nimirum Deus praeordinavit ut fierent: istud vero necessitatis genus causarum secundarum libertatem non tollere, sed potius stabilire: quoniam videlicet libertas & necessitas non se invicem perimunt, sed libertas & coactio. Nam, inquiunt, ex decreto Dei non tantum necesse est ut causa contingens & libera agat, sed etiam ut agat contingenter & libere: quia Deus decreto suo non solum determinavit singulos rerum eventus, sed etiam eorum modum & rationem.