The same absurdity from an efficacious decree of evil as evil: was Adam's rebellion necessary by God's decree?
The same absurdity seems plainly to follow from their saying that evil, even as evil, was foreordained by a decree of God which, though not effective, is nevertheless efficacious, such that once it is in place evil necessarily follows.
What then? Shall we say that God's decree made it necessary for the first man to rebel against God and break the command he had received from him? How could he justly be punished for sin if a necessity of sinning was laid on him without any prior fault?
And should not the guilt of that transgression rather be thrown back on him from whose decree so harsh a necessity is supposed to have arisen?
Latin
XLIII. Idem absurdum videtur ex eo manifeste sequi quod dicunt malum etiam qua malum, praeordinatum esse decreto Dei, quod licet effectivum non sit, nihilominus efficax est, & tale ut, eo posito, necessario malum consequatur. Quid enim, an dicemus ex Dei decreto necesse fuisse ut primus homo in Deum rebellaret, & mandatum ab eo acceptum transgrederetur? Ac quomodo potuit juste ob peccatum puniri, cui citra ullam antecedentem culpam, imposita fuit peccandi necessitas? Et annon potius istius transgressionis culpa debet in eum refundi, a cujus decreto necessitas tam dura orta fuisse supponitur?