Against the common Roman view: a natural, not-bad affection is not enough
So he does not at all approve what most theologians of the Roman School take as certain and lay down: that for a morally good work it is enough that it proceed from a natural affection that is not bad, and that the agent does not intend a bad end, even if he does not think of God, and indeed does not even have knowledge of and faith in the one true God.
As when someone among those who do not know God is moved by some natural compassion to help a person in need, or honours his parents, and returns a loan or a deposit to a friend, because he judges it fair and just and in keeping with reason. Yet he does not refer it to God's glory, either habitually or actually, but rests in the mere honesty of the action, seeking virtue for its own sake and not for anything else.
Latin
XXXVIII. Itaque minime probat quod plerique Scholae Romanae Theologi pro certo sumunt & statuunt, nempe ad bonum opus morale satis esse, ut procedat ex affectu naturali non malo, & ut qui agit malum finem non intendat, etiamsi de Deo non cogitet, imo nec unius veri Dei notitiam & fidem habeat. Ut quum quis, de numero eorum qui Deum ignorant, aliqua naturali compassione motus indigenti subvenit, aut parentibus honorem exhibet, & amico mutuum vel depositum reddit, quia id aequum & justum, ac rationi congruum judicat: nec tamen illud habitu, vel actu ad Dei gloriam refert, sed in sola actionis honestate acquiescit, virtutem non propter aliud, sed propter se expetens.