'No free choice for moral good' means only the will's bondage to sin
Thesis LIX. Nor does it conflict with this that we often read in their writers that man after sin and before grace does not have free choice with regard to moral good.
By this, as we have said, they mean only that before grace the human will is the slave of sin and has no strength of its own for good. Yet the freedom essential to the will always remains in it, a freedom which, as the Roman School itself admits, the bondage of sin does not remove, as the example of the demons makes plain.
Latin
LIX. Nec repugnat quod saepe apud eos legitur, hominem post peccatum, & ante gratiam, non esse liberi arbitrii, respectu boni moralis. Per hoc enim, ut diximus, nihil aliud significatum volunt, quam voluntatem humanam ante gratiam esse peccati servam, & ex se ad bonum nullas vires habere, quamvis semper in ea maneat libertas illa quae est voluntati essentialis, & quam, fatente ipsa Schola Romana, servitus peccati non tollit, sicut daemonum exemplo evidens est.