Jansenius' contrasts between the grace of the first and second Adam
Thesis VIII. In keeping with this he teaches throughout the work that the chief difference between the grace of the first Adam and that of the second is this: the first gave man the power to do good if he willed, while the second gives him besides the willing itself.
The first was subject to the will's nod and to its power of command; the second subjects the will to its own nod and command. The first followed the will's lead with the obedience of a servant at its heels; the second, ruling with authority, draws the will after it like such a servant.
The first went along with the will as the will went ahead, and could be overcome and turned aside. The second leads and drives the will as it follows, and can be neither overcome nor turned aside.
Latin
VIII. Quibus conformiter toto opere docet praecipuum hoc esse discrimen inter gratiam primi Adae & secundi Adae, quod illa dabat operari bonum, si homo vellet: haec dat insuper ut velit. Illa subjecta fuerat nutui & potestativo dominio voluntatis: haec suo nutui & dominio voluntatem subjicit. Illa pedissequali obsequio ductum voluntatis sequebatur: haec imperioso principatu voluntatem trahit quasi pedissequam. Illa superabiliter & declinabiliter voluntatem praeeuntem comitabatur: haec insuperabiliter & indeclinabiliter voluntatem subsequentem ducit & agit.