Inability without grace squared with freedom
Thesis XXII. Nor does he find it any harder to square the inability that comes from the absence of grace with the freedom of human choice. On his account that inability is simply the will's obstinacy in evil and its refusal to bend toward good, which began in an initially free choice.
God's own voluntary steadfastness, by which he cannot draw back from a decision once made, does not remove his freedom. In the same way the fixity of sinful humans or angels, by which they cannot take up a good will, in no way impairs their freedom. Nor is there any necessity here that conflicts with freedom or wipes out the guilt of a will gone astray. Whatever necessity there is springs entirely from hardness and stubbornness of willing, and this does not remove or lessen the guilt of those who will obstinately; it rather increases and compounds it, because through it the will clings more firmly to evil.
Latin
XXII. Nec magis difficile putat impotentiam illam, quae ex absentia gratiae oritur, cum Arbitrii humani libertate conciliare. Nam impotentia ista, juxta ipsum, nihil aliud est, quam obstinatio voluntatis in malo, & ad bonum inflexibilitas, ex libera primum electione orta. Adeoque sicut non tollit a Deo libertatem voluntaria illa firmitas, qua non potest a semel suscepta volitione retrocedere: ita nec immobilitas illa peccantium hominum aut angelorum, qua non possunt recipere voluntatem bonam, nullo modo eorum libertatem infringit. Nec ulla hic est necessitas quae repugnet libertati, culpamque abstergat exorbitantis voluntatis. Nam qualiscunque in eo necessitas reperitur, nascitur illa tota ex duritia & obstinatione volendi, quae non tollit neque minuit culpam pertinaciter volentium, sed potius eam auget & accumulat, quia per eam voluntas firmius adhaerescit malo.