Why the victorious delight is needed: the will's weakness; Augustine to Simplicianus
Thesis LXV. He traces the need for that victorious delight, which must be poured in from heaven to overcome temptations and to carry out the works of righteousness, to the weakness of the will, which makes it unable to embrace anything good unless it delights. The will by itself, with only its freedom of willing, cannot overcome the inner obstacles of pleasure or pain; nor is a person able of himself, as the Pelagians claimed, to lay down laws for the impulses born in him.
Earthly delights arising from the concupiscence innate in human beings so weigh down the will and call it back from the true good that it cannot lift itself up and break out into actions worthy of heaven, unless God sends a heavenly delight and sweetness, greater and stronger than those earthly ones. By it the will is freed from the birdlime of carnal desires and set at liberty from that captivity. Without it the will cannot will the good so strongly and intensely as to overcome the opposing temptation.
Nor is it in the will's power to take delight in heavenly things at its pleasure, as Augustine says to Simplicianus: 'Who has it in his power that his mind should be touched by a sight that would move his will to faith? Who embraces in his mind anything that does not delight him? Or who has it in his power either that something able to delight him should come before him, or that it should delight him when it comes? So when the things by which we advance toward God delight us, this is inspired and given by God's grace; it is not obtained at our own bidding and by our own effort, or by the merit of our works.'
Latin
LXV. Caeterum necessitatem victricis istius delectationis, quam oporteat coelitus infundi ad vincendas tentationes, & peragenda justitiae opera, ex voluntatis infirmitate petit, qua fit ut nihil boni amplecti possit, nisi delectet. Quia voluntas per se, & sua sola volendi libertate, interna voluptatis dolorisve impedimenta superare non potest. Nec homo ex se sufficit, ut Pelagiani volebant, ingenitis sibi motibus dare leges. Siquidem terrenae delectationes, ex innata homini concupiscentia ortae, voluntatem ita deprimunt, & a vero bono revocant, ut erigere se non possit, & in operationes coelo dignas prorumpere, nisi Deus immittat coelestem quandam delectationem atque suavitatem, terrenis illis majorem atque potentiorem, per quam carnalium concupiscentiarum visco expediatur, & in libertatem ex illa captivitate asseratur. Absque quo voluntas non potest bonum tam fortiter & intense velle, ut tentationem contrariam superet. Ut nec in ejus potestate situm est coelestibus pro libitu delectari, juxta illud Augustini ad Simplicianum, Quis habet in potestate tali viso attingi mentem suam, quo ejus voluntas moveatur ad fidem? Quis autem animo amplectitur aliquid quod eum non delectet? Aut quis habet in potestate, ut vel occurrat quod eum delectare possit, vel delectet quum occurrerit? Quum ergo nos ea delectant quibus proficiamus ad Deum, inspiratur hoc & praebetur gratia Dei, non nutu nostro & industria, aut operum meritis comparatur.